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21 Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol marks the ¯rst instance in which a multinational and poten-
tially global emissions trading system has become part of an international treaty.
The introduction of emissions trading has long been advocated by economists
because of its e±ciency aspects. Yet, the theoretically appealing concept has
undergone several adjustments and re¯nements in the international political
practice and it turned out to be more complicated in practice than expected.
As a consequence, it is not at all clear what the emissions trading scheme will
bring in terms of e®ectiveness, i.e. how much emission reduction will it even-
tually achieve, and in terms of its economic performance, i.e. what allocation
e®ects are to be expected. Several studies have already attempted to narrow
in on the range of prices of emission permits and on the resulting savings of
marginal abatement costs for di®erent regions (Weyant 1999; Boehringer 2002;
Boehringer and Loeschel 2001; den Elzen and de Moor 2002). So far, the nar-
rowing has not been too successful as Klaassen and Percl (2002) ¯nd in their
paper.
The divergence of results has many causes: modelling philosophies, complica-
tions of the de¯nition of reduction commitments during the Bonn-Marrakech-
Accords, the withdrawal of the United States from the Kyoto Protocol, and
¯nally the issue of excess emission rights (hot-air) in the countries of the for-
mer eastern block. In this paper we try to identify the impacts as well as the
interactions of three of these aspects which we believe to constitute important
determinants of the likely e®ects of international emissions trading (IET) ac-
cording to the Kyoto rules. These are the institutional details of the permit
allocation especially in countries with hot-air, the likely supply of hot-air in
the ¯rst commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and the participation of the
US in international emissions trading. All three aspects are closely linked. The
permit allocation within the suppliers of hot-air, has repercussions on the global
3permit market, and at the same time it in°uences the ability of these countries
to strategically control the global permit market. Similarly, the participation or
non-participation of the US in global trading in°uences the permit market and
the bene¯ts from strategic restrictions of hot-air supplies.
This paper mainly focusses on the welfare and revenue e®ects in the hot-air
economies. The main results can be summarized as follows. First, the alloca-
tion rule, i.e. government trading or company trading, determines the degree
to which market power can be exercised. Second, if market power can be exer-
cised, it matters for the amount of hot-air supplied whether governments seek to
maximize welfare or revenues from permit sales. In addition, the optimal hot-
air supply depends signi¯cantly on the decision whether domestic emitters are
restricted in their emissions and whether they participate in emissions trading.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a qualitative dis-
cussion of the interactions discussed above and tries to give some intuition for
the likely allocation e®ects of the trading regime agreed so far. Section 3 then
presents some practical aspects of determining the size and the functioning of
the market for greenhouse gas permits. The selection and exact de¯nition of
the scenarios for emissions trading is described in Section 4. Section 5 presents
the results of the simulations with the CGE model DART with respect to the
likely supply of hot-air and also comments on the role of the US. The paper
ends with some conclusions and an appendix which gives a description of the
DART-Model.
42 Allocation E®ects in the International Market for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions
Institutional Details of International Trading
At ¯rst sight and according to standard partial equilibrium theory, the way in
which emission permits are allocated in each state - whether through auction-
ing, grandfathering, or updating - should not make a di®erence in terms of its
allocation e®ect (Baron and Bygrave 2002). In a general equilibrium setting,
however, di®erent allocation rules will lead to di®erent distributional e®ects
within as well as across economies. In turn, these will result in di®erent general
equilibrium e®ects which are particularly strong for those participants of an
international emissions trading regime with a considerable amount of hot-air.
There are essentially two states which have been allocated about two thirds of
the hot-air in the Kyoto Protocol and the Bonn-Marrakech-Agreements, Rus-
sia and the Ukraine (they are subsumed in the simulations later under Former
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe FSU/EEC).
As the FSU/EEC is the largest seller of permits in the case of unrestricted
emissions trading, it is obvious that the FSU/EEC has the potential to in°uence
the trading price of permits to maximize its pro¯ts from selling hot-air or to
maximize welfare. As monopoly power implies a small number of sellers the
studies that analyze market power implicitly assume that trading would take
place in a centralized fashion and not through a large number of domestic entities
that could act as independent agents (Baron 1999). The Kyoto Protocol and its
related decisions do not explicitly state who is actually supposed to be trading.
Probably we will observe both government and ¯rm trading. Under the former,
market power might indeed become a relevant issue.
The other question is, how the governments will distribute their assigned amount
units (AAUs). Will they sell them to local ¯rms, or grandfather them? Will they
5distribute all their AAUs to domestic ¯rms or keep some to trade with interna-
tional ¯rms or registries themselves? The economic e®ects of these alternative
permit allocation schemes are likely to be small in economies without hot-air.
Grandfathering, i.e. free allowances to local emitters, creates an income e®ect
for those receiving the permits and it leaves the government without revenues
from permit sales. The size of this income e®ect is con¯ned to the question
whether di®erent demand structures and di®erent propensities to consume ex-
ist between the groups that might receive the rents from allocating emission
permits. In fact, in a world with perfect competition, a constant government
budget surplus or de¯cit, and with representative consumers and producers - as
it is usually assumed in CGE-models - there is no di®erence in the allocation.
Of course, the rents to speci¯c groups in the case of grandfathering or additional
government revenues in the case of an auctioning of permits change the internal
distribution of incomes. Such distributional issues are not subject of this paper.
For a detailed discussion of di®erent allocation modes see Harrison and Radov
(2002).
In economies with a considerable amount of hot-air the allocation scheme does
matter. Essentially three institutional settings with di®ering repercussions on
international permit markets can be considered. First, governments of economies
with hot-air can insulate their domestic industries and consumers emitting
greenhouse gases from the international permit market by relying on state trad-
ing on the international permit market and by issuing free permits to local
emitters which are not tradable internationally. Hence, the governments can
maintain a zero domestic price for emissions and they can choose the amount
of hot-air that is sold internationally at the then prevailing world market prices
(Scenario ET1).
The second option is to include the domestic ¯rms in emissions trading and
charge the same price to all emitters - domestic and foreign. In this case, state
6trading - i.e. only the government can in the ¯rst place sell permits - allows a
government to strategically restrict the total supply of emission permits at its
disposal (ET2). In this setting no price wedge is driven between national and
foreign permit prices. As noted above, under usual CGE model assumptions
it does not matter whether the domestic ¯rms have to buy their rights from
the government or receive permits for free. Thus, this scenario can also be
interpreted in such a way that the government decides on the overall amount
of permits to be grandfathered to ¯rms which then participate in IET. The
government can, for example, only grandfathers business-as-usual emissions and
directly sell some hot-air on the international market to generate revenue. Such
a scenario is indeed very likely.
The third option of grandfathering all permits to local emitters or citizens ac-
cording to some rule would most likely preclude any strategic behavior because
it would e®ectively produce perfect competition on the supply side of the per-
mit market. The governments registry would only administer the bookkeeping
of all permit sales with foreigners (ET3). In such a case all permits including
all hot-air would be used either domestically or sold on international markets.
As in the second option, domestic permit prices and world market prices will
equalize but at a much lower level.
The allocation e®ects of the three scenarios di®er signi¯cantly. State trading
of excess amounts of permits (ET1) not used inside the country will give lo-
cal emitters a free endowment of permits which results in an improvement of
comparative advantage of the energy intensive producers on world markets. It
also gives the government the ability to strategically manipulate the supply of
hot-air, i.e. of additional emission permits, on world markets.
To the contrary, a grandfathering of all permits to local emitters (ET3) will re-
move this strategic ability, but it will also endow ¯rms with an additional source
of income. However, some studies (Boehringer 2002; Loeschel and Zhang 2002;
7den Elzen and de Moor 2001b) claim that this income can not be generated
since the permit price might drop to zero. This depends essentially on the hy-
pothesis that grandfathered permits will lead to a competitive supply behavior,
hence revenue maximization with hot-air on international markets by restrict-
ing supply is not possible. In addition, these studies ignore the possibility of
banking.
If there is state trading and the economies with hot-air are able to coordinate
their supply behavior they can reap considerable rents from restricting supplies
(ET1 and ET2). But these gains depend not only on the ability to coordinate
strategies between the largest hot-air countries. The local allocation rules are
important as well. Hence, a careful treatment of the institutional details of
permit allocation and permit trading in the economies with hot-air is necessary
in order to correctly simulate the likely allocation e®ects.
Market Power and Hot-Air Trading
Studying the impact of the di®erent internal allocation regimes of hot-air on
the global permit market is necessary if the regions involved are large enough
to in°uence world market prices through their actions. The two options for
governments with a signi¯cant amount of hot air-air - participating in global
trading without having local trading and global trading with local emitters
facing the same permit prices - will have di®erent allocative e®ects.
If the FSU/EEC governments - provided they build a cartel - decide not to
charge the local greenhouse gas emitters the world market permit price or not
to allow these emitters to sell grandfathered emission rights on the global permit
market, they can sell a restricted amount of hot-air on world markets in such a
way as to maximize government revenue or welfare. At the same time local fossil
energy users do not face an emission constraint nor do they have an incentive
to reduce emissions. Selling hot-air then has several e®ects:
8² It raises government revenue in economies with hot-air (revenue e®ect),
² By lowering the global emissions constraint it reduces gross energy prices
in the other Annex B countries (marginal abatement cost e®ect)
² These lower gross energy prices raise world demand for fossil fuels - com-
pared to a situation without hot-air trading - thus leading to higher energy
prices even in the countries not participating in emissions trading (demand
e®ect).
These three e®ects di®er between the two scenarios ET1 and ET2. Also they
imply that revenue maximization, which is assumed in many partial equilibrium
studies (Boehringer and Loeschel 2001; Burniaux 1999), does not necessarily
lead to the same results as welfare maximization, which is assumed in most
general equilibrium analyses (Boehringer 2002, Bernstein et al. 1999), even
though Babiker et al. (2002) only ¯nd a minor di®erence between the two.
This can be illustrated by considering the marginal e®ects of an increase of the
amount of hot-air supplied on world markets. Looking ¯rst at scenario ET1,
where private ¯rms in the hot-air economies do not participate in emissions
trading and face no emission restrictions, an additional supply of hot-air will -
besides raising government revenues - increase exports (respectively reduce im-
ports) of fossil fuels through the demand e®ect. At the same time local producers
of energy intensive goods face higher energy prices whereas foreign producers
may or may not experience an increase in energy costs. In particular, the other
Annex B countries experience lower gross energy prices through the abatement
cost e®ect and the Non-Annex B countries higher prices again through the de-
mand e®ect. Hence, a shift of energy intensive production away from hot-air
countries and Non-Annex B countries towards the abating countries will take
place resulting in a change in comparative advantage and possible welfare losses
to the hot-air suppliers. As a consequence, maximizing permit revenues and
maximizing welfare will not yield identical optimal hot-air amounts to be sold
9by the FSU/EEC. If the welfare e®ects from direct fuel exports dominate the
indirect e®ect through the energy intensive goods then a fuel exporting country
like FSU/EEC would sell more hot-air in the welfare maximization case than in
the revenue maximization case.
In scenario ET2 where the FSU/EEC sell a ¯xed share of the overall permits
to local and international emitters alike, an additional supply of hot-air has
the same three e®ects, but now the marginal abatement cost e®ect also applies
for the domestic economy that bene¯ts from lower permit prices, too. Hence,
energy use increases in all Annex B countries. In addition, the relative price of
energy intensive goods to the other goods falls thus leading to an expansion of
these sectors. For the hot-air region FSU/EEC this means that an additional
amount of hot-air promotes higher exports of energy and increased production
of energy intensive goods. Compared to revenue maximization, welfare max-
imization would tend to lead to a higher supply of hot-air in order to reap
the bene¯ts from the increased competitiveness of energy sectors and energy
intensive industries.
Summarized, the positive welfare e®ect of additional supplies of hot-air is larger
in ET2 than in ET1. This is so because in ET1 additional hot-air reduces the
comparative advantage of energy intensive industries in the FSU/EEC whereas
it improves it in ET2. Therefore one can expect that a move from revenue
maximization to welfare maximization in the determination of the optimal sup-
ply of hot-air will result in a larger di®erence in the scenario ET2. The issue
of maximizing welfare or revenue is therefore most important if the FSU/EEC
also use the permit system inside their own economies. In our simulation stud-
ies in section 5 we will analyze the welfare and revenue e®ects of the di®erent
scenarios empirically.
10The Role of the US Participation in Hot-Air Decisions
Finally, the behavior of the US is also important for the strategic and institu-
tional designs in hot-air economies. The US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol
essentially moved the largest economy into the Non-Annex B group. If the US
rejoin the Protocol, the qualitative e®ects of alternative hot-air trading regimes
remain the same, but the size of the international allocation e®ects will change.
If the US join the international emissions trading with their Kyoto target this has
basically three e®ects for the hot-air economies compared to the case of emissions
trading without the US. First, as the US will be a permit importer, the permit
price increases which, at the same time, increases the bene¯ts from selling hot-air
and thus the optimal amount of hot-air supply. Second, US demand for energy
and energy intensive goods drops, which lowers world energy prices and hurts
the FSU/EEC energy exporters. Third, the gross energy prices in the FSU/EEC
are a®ected. In scenario ET1 where emissions are free for FSU/EEC ¯rms, gross
energy prices fall in the FSU/EEC due to the falling world market prices and
the FSU/EEC ¯rms gain compared to a scenario without US participation in
international emissions trading. In contrast, in scenario ET2 where FSU/EEC
¯rms participate in international emissions trading as well, they su®er from the
now higher permit price.
3 Issues in Modelling Hot-Air Trading
The qualitative aspects of the interactions of di®erent participation structures,
institutional details, and strategic supply behavior already give some important
insights. However, the net e®ects can only be assessed in a quantitative study by
using a simulation model. Existing studies on hot-air and market power di®er
mainly in the way they model the strategic behavior of the hot-air economies.
In addition, there are a number of other empirical questions that need to be
11resolved and are also treated di®erently in the existing studies. These include
the regional aggregation, the amount of available hot-air, complications through
other policies such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Imple-
mentation (JI) and sinks and ¯nally the important issue of banking. Table 1
summarizes the di®erent modelling approaches and results of selected studies
on hot-air trading and market power. Columns 3 and 4 are concerned with
the assumptions on the strategic behavior of the hot-air economies. Column 5
reports the di®erent estimates for the amount of available hot-air. Column 6,
¯nally, gives the optimal behavior of the hot-air economies. The di®erent issues
are discussed in the following paragraphs.
[Table 1]
Strategic Behavior
As discussed in section 2, it is likely that - under certain institutional setups
- the hot-air countries will act strategically. To analyze the outcome of the
FSU/EEC exercising market power, a modeler has ¯rst to make an assumption
on the variable the FSU/EEC wishes to maximize. This could be, as Table 1
shows, welfare, revenue or other measures such as GDP or consumption. Second,
the modeler has to make an assumption on how the market power is actually
exercised. One possibility for the FSU/EEC is to participate in emissions trad-
ing but to put a markup much like an export tari® on the FSU/EEC export
price of permits. As a result, the FSU/EEC pays a lower permit price than
the rest of the Annex B countries. This scenario, which is economically the
same as an export quota, is modelled by Bernstein et al. (1999) and also by
Burniaux (1999) who assumes that the FSU/EEC is directly setting the inter-
national permit price, and presumably also in Boehringer and Loeschel (2001).
In all the cases the FSU/EEC participates in the emission market and even does
not only sell hot-air, but also permits resulting from true emission reductions.
12Boehringer (2002) proceeds di®erently and assumes that the FSU/EEC exports
a ¯xed amount of emission rights, while inside the FSU/EEC permits are given
away for free.1 Other CGE studies just state that the FSU/EEC act as price
makers and are able to limit the amount of hot-air available for sale (Manne and
Richels 2001), that they do not supply all their permits on the market (Babiker
et al. 2002) or mention a ceiling on the supply side (Paltsev 2000) without
explaining what is meant by this.
In summary, the models di®er with respect to the assumptions about the par-
ticipation of the FSU/EEC ¯rms in emissions trading, the quantitative emis-
sion restrictions for domestic FSU/EEC emissions and exports and the price
of FSU/EEC emissions compared to the world market price. As discussed in
section 2, there are basically three realistic setups that we analyze in this study
to see whether they make a di®erence in the allocative e®ect.
Regional Aggregation
Another issue is, that there are several countries that can sell hot-air. Due to
the lack of data most studies work with the aggregated regions FSU and EEC
or even one region FSU/EEC, which also includes Former Soviet Republics
that are not Annex B countries. The studies then assume that the FSU/EEC
behaves as a monopoly/cartel or that the FSU does so, while the EEC as a
competitive fringe will follow the price leadership of the domination region FSU
or that both do not cooperate at all (Boehringer and Loeschel 2001; Loeschel
and Zhang 2002). Working with the regional aggregate FSU thus implies that
Russia and the Ukraine coordinate their behavior and build a cartel. In this
study we will also aggregate all hot-air countries to one region FSU/EEC.
13What is the Available Amount of Hot-Air?
Hot-air is de¯ned as the di®erence between projected baseline emissions and
the Kyoto target, in the case where the former turn out to be smaller then
the latter. Thus every estimate of hot-air depends on the projected baseline
emissions which depend among others on the expected economic development
of the FSU/EEC. Estimates for the overall amount of hot-air available in 2010
range from 100 to 500 million metric tons of carbon (MtC). The EIA (2002)
projects 2010 emission to be 978 MtC in the FSU and EEC, while emissions in
1990 were 1347 MtC. In addition, the FSU is allowed to credit another 46 MtC
for sinks and the EEC 7.5 MtC (den Elzen and de Moor 2001a). This, implies
an overall amount of 410 MtC hot-air. The largest suppliers are Russia and
the Ukraine who account for about one third of total hot-air each, followed by
Romania who provides around 15% (Missfeldt and Villavicenco 2002). Table 1
reports the di®erent amounts of hot-air used in the di®erent studies.
Partial equilibrium models use these estimates directly (Boehringer and Loeschel
2001; den Elzen and de Moor 2001b), while most CGE models calibrate their
benchmark scenario where no abatement action is taken to such emission pro-
jections. Once a certain emission path is chosen, the amount of hot-air is seen as
¯xed. This is misleading though, as climate policies in some regions will change
the emission path even in regions with hot-air. As soon as some countries face
binding emission constraints, their gross energy prices increase. This, on one
hand, shifts the production of energy intensive goods to the countries without
emission restrictions (including the hot-air countries) increasing their demand
for energy. This e®ect is called "leakage". On the other hand, the loss of income
in the abating countries reduces import demand and thus energy demand in the
non-abating countries. In our model, for example, a scenario where the Annex B
countries except the US unilaterally reduce their emissions to reach their Kyoto
target, leads to an overall increase of energy demand and thus of emissions in
14the FSU/EEC, so that the available hot-air is 6.3% less than in the benchmark.
Other scenarios, such as emissions trading, that change gross energy prices and
thus energy demand in the FSU/EEC have comparable e®ects.
Summarized, the available hot-air, de¯ned as the di®erence between the Kyoto
target and the actual emissions of the FSU/EEC depends on the economic
development in the FSU/EEC as well as on the level and cost of abatement in
the rest of the world.
CDM, JI and Sinks
Three further issues that in°uence the amount of hot-air traded are CDM, JI
and sink enhancement. All mechanisms provide alternative sources of supply of
emission reduction permits for economies with high marginal abatement costs.
Hence, they lower the incentive of the Annex B countries to buy hot-air from the
FSU/EEC. The studies listed in Table 1 ignore all three mechanisms, though
JI can be seen as being part of international emissions trading. In the following
simulations we do exactly the same. We assume that JI is part of IET while we
ignore CDM and sink enhancement as substitutes for permit trading.
Banking
In Marrakech and Bonn it was agreed that assigned amount units (AAUs) re-
sulting from the Kyoto commitment can be banked without a time constraint.
Credits from JI or CDM can be banked up to a limit of 2.5 respectively 5% of
a Party's initial assigned amount. Sink credits can not be banked (IETA 2001).
On the supply side, banking provides an incentive to reduce the supply of per-
mits in order to save emission rights while prices are low, as they might become
more valuable in future commitment periods. On the demand side, provided
that rising permit prices are expected, there is an incentive to buy more per-
15mits than presently needed. Both e®ects, lower supplies and increased demand,
tend to raise permit prices above the level obtained in a short-term market
without banking. These e®ects are - with the exception of study (5) - not in-
corporated in the studies listed in Table I and will also not be incorporated in
the simulation exercises in this paper.2
The simulation results presented below therefore produce lower bounds for the
permit prices as hot-air suppliers might restrict their supply even further than
shown here for banking purposes.3 In the competitive scenario ET3 in which
there is an excess supply of permits, hence a zero price (see section 4), demand
will also make sure that a low but positive price will prevail since banking of
permits would constitute an almost costly insurance against a future scarcity of
permits. Hence, the extreme model result of ET3 with zero prices is extremely
unlikely to materialize in reality.
4 Policy Simulations
In order to assess the economic implications of di®erent participation structures,
institutional details and the treatment of hot-air on international emissions trad-
ing, we use the DART model for running di®erent policy scenarios that will be
de¯ned below.
The DART Model
The DART (Dynamic Applied Regional Trade) Model is a multi-region, multi-
sector recursive dynamic CGE model of the world economy developed by the Kiel
Institute for World Economics to analyze climate policies. It covers 11 sectors
and 12 regions that are summarized in Table II and the two production factors
labor and capital. The economic structure of the DART model is fully speci¯ed
for each region and covers production, ¯nal consumption and investment. A
16more detailed model description can be found in the appendix.
[Table II]
Formulation of Policy Scenarios
In order to focus on the allocative e®ects of the di®erent scenarios on prices,
trade and production structure, and also for practical modelling reasons we
have to make a number of simplifying assumptions. First, we do not include
banking and CDM in our study. JI is only implicitly modelled through Annex
B emissions trading. The sink credits are included in the reduction targets (see
Table III), but we do not model sink enhancement. For the implementation of
the Kyoto Protocol we assume that the regions start emission reductions in 2005
and then reduce their emission by a ¯xed amount each year, until the target
is reached in 2010. For the hot-air modelling we focus on the cartel case and
aggregate all hot-air countries to the region FSU/EEC.
[Table III]
Besides the benchmark where we assume that no emission reductions are un-
dertaken, the analyzed scenarios di®er in two dimensions. The ¯rst is permit
allocation in the hot-air economies. As discussed in section 2 three realistic
scenarios for international emissions trading among the Annex B countries, in-
cluding the hot-air, should be distinguished:
ET1: The FSU/EEC government is selling a ¯xed number of permits (hot-
air) internationally. The FSU/EEC ¯rms are isolated from the emission
market and receive their permits from the FSU/EEC government for free.4
ET2: The FSU/EEC government is restricting the amount of available permits
but the FSU/EEC ¯rms participate in IET and the international permit
price also applies domestically.
17ET3: The FSU/EEC government grandfathers all permits (including the hot-
air) to its domestic ¯rms that participate in competitive IET.
For the two scenarios ET1 and ET2 where the FSU/EEC is able to exercise
market power, we di®erentiate between welfare maximization (ET1W/ET2W)
and revenue maximization (ET1R/ET2R).
To determine the welfare and revenue maxima for scenarios ET1 and ET2 we
vary the amount of hot-air supplied by the FSU/EEC from 5% to 100%. Hot-air
is de¯ned as the di®erence between the Kyoto target and the 2010 benchmark
emissions and amounts to 465 MtC in our model.5 The revenue is in both
scenarios the revenue for exported permits. Thus, in scenario ET2 the FSU/EEC
government does not consider the revenue from its permit sales to local emitters,
as it only amounts to a redistribution within the country.
In all scenarios the US are not participating in emissions trading, as this is cur-
rently the most likely scenario. At the end of section 5 we will shortly comment
on the results we get by assuming that the US rejoin the Kyoto commitment
and engage in emissions trading
5 Simulation Results
The question is how the di®erent institutional set ups ET1-ET3 that di®er
in the objective of the FSU/EEC (welfare vs. revenue maximization) and the
permit allocation in the FSU/EEC, in°uence the outcome of international emis-
sions trading. First, we compare welfare and revenue maximization in the two
scenarios with market power (ET1 and ET2). Next, we assess how the non-
participation (ET1) respectively participation (ET2) of the FSU/EEC ¯rms in
the permit market in°uences the outcome of the optimization process. In addi-
tion, we take a closer look at scenario ET2R as it shows the largest di®erence
to the other scenarios and on competitive trading (ET3). Finally we comment
18on the role of the US participation. All following results refer to the year 2010
which marks the midpoint of the ¯rst Kyoto commitment period and is fre-
quently chosen as the year of reference.
Welfare versus Revenue Maximization
As discussed in section 2 welfare and revenue maximization do not lead to the
same supply behavior and it can be expected that the optimal amount of hot-air
is larger under welfare maximization. Table IV shows that this is indeed the
case. Note that the provision of a certain percentage of hot-air does not lead to
the same overall FSU/EEC emissions in the two scenarios. While in scenario
ET1 the domestic FSU/EEC emissions change relative to the benchmark due
to the increase in international fossil fuel prices, such a leakage can not occur
in scenario ET2 where the FSU/EEC government restricts the total amounts of
permits used by foreign and domestic ¯rms. Furthermore, in scenario ET3W
which is equivalent to the benchmark, not all available hot-air is used, since only
220 MtC are required to meet the emission targets of the countries participating
in IET. Also, when ¯rms are participating in IET (ET2), not only hot-air is
sold, but also permits resulting from real emission reductions (see discussion of
scenario ET2W below).
[Table IV]
When we compare revenue to welfare maximization in the scenario ET1 where
the FSU/EEC ¯rms receive their permits for free we ¯nd the supply of hot-air
under revenue maximization to be 5% points below that under welfare maxi-
mization. As the loss in welfare due to revenue maximization is close to zero
though, both mechanisms lead in fact approximately to the same welfare e®ect.6
If the FSU/EEC ¯rms are participating in emissions trading (ET2), the di®er-
ence is - as postulated in section 2 - much larger. Now, welfare maximization
leads to the provision of 35% of the hot-air while under revenue maximization it
19would be optimal to sell no hot-air at all. The reason is that in scenario ET1W
the provision of more hot-air increases welfare through higher energy exports
and decreases it by a loss in the comparative advantage in the production of
energy intensive goods. In scenario ET2W, however, the comparative advantage
is increased through a larger hot-air supply, as the domestic FSU/EEC ¯rms
that participate in emissions trading bene¯t from the fall in permit prices. Here,
both e®ects work in the same direction such that an additional supply of hot-air
will increase welfare. In ET2W, revenue maximization results in a welfare loss of
approximately 1%. The welfare and revenue curves of the di®erent restrictions
are plotted in Figure 1.
[Figure 1]
Comparing revenue and welfare maximization from the point of view of the
FSU/EEC, the ¯nal welfare result is practically identical in the scenarios ET1
with unconstrained emissions in the FSU/EEC. This is mainly due to the fact
that the revenue e®ect dominates and that energy price e®ects of increased
energy exports through an increase in hot-air are compensated by the loss in
comparative advantage of energy-intensive industries thus leaving a very small
net e®ect. This is quite di®erent in ET2 where both competitive e®ects go into
the same direction, such that increasing hot-air supplies beyond the revenue
maximizing level e®ectively raises welfare. The curvature of the welfare and
revenue curves (Figure 1) also indicate that from a welfare point of view the
exact amount of hot-air supplied does not matter much since the curves turn out
quite °at. Only if the governments look for revenue maximization in ET2 the
determination of the share of hot-air brought to international markets makes
an important di®erence. Note also, that the results of optimal hot-air supply in
scenario ET1R are in line with the results of studies reported in Table 1 where
these are comparable. The studies by den Elzen und de Moor (2001a, 2001b,
2002) and Boehringer and Loeschel (2001), Loeschel und Zhang (2002) ¯nd that
20under revenue maximization a supply of 30 - 60% of hot-air is optimal. Our
study is at the lower end of this range.7
The two Institutional Setups under Welfare Maximization
Under welfare maximization, the di®erence between the hot-air supplies in the
two institutional setups ET1 and ET2 is relatively small and overall FSU/EEC
emissions (domestic plus exported) are almost identical. A signi¯cant di®erence
between the two scenarios can only be seen in the variation in the world permit
price and the resulting world prices for fossil fuels (see table V8).
[Table V]
If FSU/EEC ¯rms need to buy permits for emitting CO2 as assumed in scenario
ET2W, they will decrease their emissions relative to the benchmark as this
is cheaper than to buy permits at the world market price. This essentially
happens because FSU/EEC ¯rms have much lower abatement costs than the
rest of the Annex B countries. 15% of the FSU/EEC permits sold on the
international permit market are not hot-air but are associated with emission
reductions in the FSU/EEC. The resulting increase in permit supply cuts down
the permit price compared to scenario ET1W and raises energy demand in
the countries participating in emissions trading. As a result net energy prices
world wide are slightly higher in ET2W than in ET1W while gross prices in
the countries that participate in emissions trading decline noticeable by 2.5 -
3%. For the non-Annex B countries welfare e®ects are ambiguous. In the energy
exporting countries the FSU/EEC trading scenario ET2W with its higher energy
demand and higher world market prices implies a slightly higher welfare than
scenario ET1W. The energy importing countries are slightly better o® with
the FSU/EEC excluding domestic ¯rms from IET (ET1W) and the resulting
higher permit price and lower net energy price. This is also the case for the
FSU/EEC itself. It faces lower gross energy prices in scenario ET1W resulting
21in a slight welfare increase compared to scenario ET2W. This is so because
the FSU/EEC under welfare maximization can by selecting the optimal hot-air
supply introduce the equivalent of an optimal tari® on fossil energy.
The impact of the two institutional regimes on the welfare in the abating Annex
B countries is predominantly determined by the permit price e®ect. In ET1W
the permit price is 19.5 $/tC and drops by more than 50% to 7.7$/tC in ET2W.
This is due to the fact that in addition to the hot-air - i.e. benchmark emissions
in 2010 minus Kyoto target - domestic permits from real emission reductions
are sold since the FSU/EEC ¯rms have su±ciently low marginal abatement
costs. As a consequence, regions like WEU get cheaper permits in ET2W than
in ET1W and thus experience higher welfare e®ects in ET2W.
Revenue Maximization in Scenario ET2
The scenario ET2 in which the FSU/EEC ¯rms participate in IET is of partic-
ular interest. The di®erence between revenue and welfare maximization under
the optimal hot-air supply is largest, and under revenue maximization the low-
est emissions world wide as well as the lowest emissions from the FSU/EEC
(including the exported hot-air) will be achieved.
The emission e®ect is, of course due to the positive price on emissions imposed
on local emitters in the FSU/EEC. But the hot-air available at the government
level - de¯ned as the di®erence between the Kyoto commitment and benchmark
emissions - will also not be supplied on world markets. The reason is the high
price for permits. At high prices only few permits will be sold internally, hence
the e®ective amount of permits that can be brought to the international mar-
ket increases. One could also explain this e®ect in a di®erent setting, where
local emitters receive permits according to benchmark emissions which then are
tradable on the international market. At the world market prices and the low
abatement costs more than 100 MtC would be supplied by the private sector of
22the FSU/EEC. Maximizing revenues of permit sales exports would result only
in a small share of hot-air supplied. In fact, it would be optimal to keep all
hot-air because the private supplies would already su±ce to reach the revenue
maximum for the FSU/EEC.9
These internal incentives to supply hot-air also in part explain the drastic rise in
hot-air supplies in the case of welfare maximization. Increasing hot-air supplies
improve the competitive situation of the energy sectors in the FSU/EEC as
discussed above. The additional hot-air also lowers permit prices from 31 $/tC
to less than 8 $/tC. Such a drop in permit prices drastically reduces the permit
supply of local emitters, hence the government can increase its supplies strongly
from 0% to 35%. Finally it is interesting to note that scenario ET2 is close
to the welfare maximum at almost every hot-air supply, probably because the
revenue e®ect from the international permit market and the competitiveness
e®ect together with the abatement cost e®ect inside the FSU/EEC seem to
compensate each other.
Competitive Trading
Our third institutional set up leads to a competitive market. As a result the
supply of hot-air is not restricted and the permit price drops to zero and scenario
ET3 reduces to the benchmark. The exported permits of 220 MtC reported
in Table IV is the amount of hot-air supply at which the price reaches zero.
Thus, in the benchmark WEU, JPN and ANC emit together 220 MtC more
then their common Kyoto target. In any case, ET3 is associated with the
lowest permit prices and the highest world market prices for fossil fuels with the
well known implications for energy exporting and importing countries and the
abating Annex B regions. Finally, if we compare the FSU/EEC welfare under
strategic behavior to the welfare under a competitive market, we can see that
only under ET1 the FSU/EEC can signi¯cantly gain welfare. Under scenario
23ET2 the increase in welfare compared to ET3 is almost negligible. The reason
is that ET3 is the same scenario as ET2 with 100% hot-air supply. As already
explained, the welfare curve in Figure 1 is quite °at and the bene¯ts from further
permit revenue through a restriction of hot-air are compensated by the higher
domestic permit prices.
The E®ects of the US Rejoining the Kyoto Protocol
Table VI reports optimal hot-air supply and resulting permit price, permit ex-
port, emissions and welfare in FSU/EEC for scenarios ET1W, ET2W (welfare
maximization in the hot-air economies) and ET3 (competitive trading) if the US
rejoin the Kyoto Protocol and engage in international emissions trading com-
pared to the original scenarios without US emission reductions. To alleviate
comparisons, the table repeats some of the results shown already in table IV.
[Table VI]
Comparing the (+US) to the (-US) scenario shows that indeed the qualitative
results remain the same, while the size of the e®ects changes. As expected,
permit prices and permit exports in the optimal scenarios increase substantially
even though the FSU/EEC react in ET1 and ET2 by more than doubling their
hot-air supply. As a results, permit revenues under market power are three
to ¯ve times larger with the US participation and welfare in the FSU/EEC
increases as well. The increase in welfare is higher in ET1 as in ET2 because in
scenario ET2 the ¯rms in the FSU/EEC su®er from the higher permit prices.
Summarized, the curves in ¯gure 1 are shifted to the north-east. In the case of
competitive trading the US demand for permits leads to a positive permit price
of 8.64 $/tC and the FSU/EEC gain in welfare as well.
246 Conclusions
In this paper we analyzed the impacts of the interaction between di®erent par-
ticipation structures, institutional set ups and strategic supply of hot-air in in-
ternational emissions trading. Many studies have found a wide range of optimal
hot-air supplies. We have shown that the permit allocation within the hot-air
countries is an important determinant of hot-air supplies. Three institutional
scenarios appear to be most realistic:
² the FSU/EEC governments give emission permits to the domestic ¯rms
for free and isolate them from the international permit market while the
governments themselves trade a certain percentage of the hot-air on the
world market,
² domestic ¯rms participate in IET but the FSU/EEC government controls
the amount of permits that are available for both domestic ¯rms and
international entities,
² the FSU/EEC government grandfathers all emission permits to local ¯rms
that participate in IET
Within these three settings optimal hot-air supplies vary between 0% and 35%.
This variation is also in°uenced by the objective function used by the govern-
ments of the hot-air countries provided they cooperate in order to strategically
restrict the supply of hot-air. Under welfare maximization always more hot-air
is sold than under revenue maximization, mainly because under welfare max-
imization hot-air supplies can be used as trade policies for energy sectors and
for energy-intensive industries.
The question as to whether the optimal degree of hot-air really is an important
one for the hot-air economies depends mainly on the objective they are pursuing.
In the case of a simple revenue maximization from the export of permits, it
25matters simply because - in the case of no US participation and free permits to
local producers - revenues can be increased by roughly 7 billion US$ to 10 billion
US$ if hot-air exports are restricted to 30%. Similarly strong e®ects occur in the
other scenarios. If welfare maximization is the objective, it matters only if the
¯rms in the hot-air economies are not restricted in their emissions and excluded
from the permit market. In the case where ¯rms participate in emissions trading,
a variation in the share of hot-air supplied has almost no e®ect on welfare. This
happens because the increased revenue from restricting hot-air is o®set by the
negative impacts on the domestic industry. Again the competitiveness e®ects of
the energy price changes which accompany the variation in hot-air are at work.
The issue of hot-air might be of importance though from a di®erent perspective.
The simulation results show that the welfare gains the hot-air economies can
realize by moving from one scenario to another are smaller than the negative
welfare externalities in the other Annex B countries. These countries are espe-
cially a®ected by the varying permit and energy prices. Thus it turns out, that
strategic behavior of the hot-air economies might not have signi¯cant welfare
e®ects on the hot-air economies themselves, but that the welfare e®ects in the
other Annex B regions can be used as a strategic opportunity in international
climate negotiations.
Notes
1Unfortunately it is not stated clearly how the FSU/EEC permit system
works, but as marginal abatement cost are reported for all Annex B countries
except the FSU/EEC this is what was most likely modelled.
2If banking is analyzed, this is mostly done using partial equilibrium models
as e.g. in Steenberghe (2003).
3This result is reported in Manne and Richels (2001) with the help of an
26intertemporal optimization model.
4To be precise, the permits not designated for the world market are sold
on a domestic market. In all relevant scenarios though these domestic permits
exceed the domestic demand, so that the price is zero.
5We thus de¯ne hot-air as a ¯xed number. The di®erence to the EIA estimate
of 410 MtC mentioned in section 3, results from the calibration of the DART
model, which is described in the appendix, and also from the fact that we
account for sink credits.
6This is also found by Babiker et al. (2002).
7The scenarios of the other studies listed in Table 1 are either not comparable
to our scenarios or do not report their results in a way to allow for meaningful
comparisons. Note also that these studies assume that only 220 - 375 MtC
hot-air is available compared to 465 MtC in this study.
8We only report the results for the Annex B regions and China and Middle
East in order to keep the presentation of results clear. The latter two regions ex-
emplify the e®ects for non-abating, energy importing in contrast to non-abating,
energy exporting regions. Detailed results are available from the authors upon
request.
9The result of an optimal supply of 0% of hot-air is accidental. In fact, the
optimal supply is slightly below 0%, i.e. the FSU/EEC would bank even more
than the predicted amount of hot-air.
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31Table II: Dimensions of the DART-Model
Countries and regions Production sectors
Annex B Energy
USA USA COL Coal
WEU West European Union CRU Crude Oil
ANC Canada, Australia, GAS Natural Gas
New Zealand OIL Re¯ned Oil Products
JPN Japan EGW Electricity
FSU/ Former Soviet Union,
EEC Eastern Europe Non energy
AGR Agricultural production
Non-Annex B IMS Iron Metal Steal
LAM Latin America CPP Chemicals, rubber, paper
IND India and plastic products
PAS Paci¯c Asia Y Other manufactures
CPA China, Hong Kong and services
MEA Middle East, North Africa TRN Transport
AFR Sub-Saharan Africa CGD Investment good
ROW Rest of the World
32Table III: Emission Targets after Marrakech (including sinks)
Country Original target Marrakech target
as percentage of 1990 emissions
USA 94% 96.8 %
WEU 92% 94.8%
ANC 97% 109 % (*)
JPN 94% 99.2%
FSU/EEC 98.5% 103%
(*) As emissions have grown by more than 9 % since 1990, this target does not imply
that hot-air is available in ANC.
Source: (Boehringer 2002; Boehringer and Loeschel 2001)
33Table IV: Results for Welfare and Revenue Maximization
Hot-air Permit Permit Emissions Welfare
Scenario (1) price (2) export (3) (4) (5)
Welfare Maximization
ET1W 30% 19.55 139 1058 100.7
ET2W 35% 7.68 190 1074 100.1
ET3W = bench 0.00 220 1132 100.0
Revenue Maximization
ET1R 25% 25.62 116 1037 100.7
ET2R 0% 31.14 105 912 99.1
(1) Optimal % hot-air supplied
(Hot-air = 2010 benchmark emissions minus Kyoto target = 465 MtC)
(2) In US$ per tC
(3) FSU/EEC permit exports in MtC
(4) Domestic + exported emissions from FSU/EEC in MtC
(5) Benchmark 2010 = 100
34Table V: The Scenarios under Optimal FSU/EEC Behavior
ET3¤ ET1W ET2W ET1R ET2R
Welfare (Equivalent Variation)
USA 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
WEU 100.0 99.2 99.7 99.0 98.9
ANC 100.0 99.2 99.7 99.0 98.7
JPN 100.0 99.7 99.9 99.6 99.5
FSU/EEC 100.0 100.7 100.1 100.7 99.1
MEA 100.0 99.4 99.7 99.3 98.9
CPA 100.0 100.1 100.0 100.1 100.1
Gross Oil Price (1997 = 1)
USA 1.59 1.58 1.58 1.57 1.57
WEU 1.71 1.79 1.74 0.82 1.84
ANC 1.69 1.76 1.72 1.78 1.80
JPN 1.49 1.54 1.51 1.56 1.58
FSU/EEC 1.65 1.64 1.68 1.64 1.76
MEA 1.81 1.79 1.80 1.79 1.78
CPA 1.78 1.76 1.77 1.76 1.75
Emissions in GtC
USA 1.72 1.73 1.73 1.74 1.74
WEU 1.05 1.00 1.03 0.98 0.98
ANC 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.24
JPN 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.38 0.38
FSU/EEC 0.91 0.92 0.88 0.92 0.81
MEA 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56
CPA 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.34 1.35
Total¤¤ 8.20 8.16 8.16 8.15 8.06
¤ ET3 = benchmark, as excess supply of hot-air leads to a permit price of zero.
¤¤ Emissions of all regions taken together
35Table VI: Welfare Maximization with (+US) and without (-US) the US Partic-
ipating in the Kyoto Protocol and International Emissions Trading
Hot-air Permit Permit Emissions Welfare
Scenario (1) price (2) export (3) (4) (5)
US not participating in Kyoto and international emissions trading
ET1W-US 30% 19.55 139 1058 100.7
ET2W-US 35% 7.68 190 1074 100.1
ET3-US = bench 0.00 220 1132 100.0
US participating in Kyoto and international emissions trading
ET1W+US 65% 32.91 302 1230 103.7
ET2W+US 70% 21.51 397 1237 101.8
ET3+US 100% 8.64 494 1376 101.1
(1) Optimal % hot-air supply
(hot-air = 2010 benchmark emissions minus Kyoto target = 465 MtC)
(2) In US$ per tC
(3) FSU/EEC permit exports in MtC
(4) Domestic + exported emissions from FSU/EEC in MtC
(5) Benchmark 2010 = 100
36